Stock market development and economic growth: a matter of informational problems by Salvatore Capasso
Stock Market Development and Economic Growth: 







 and  




The aim of this paper is to provide further insights into the linkages between stock market 
development and economic growth. When it is not possible to distinguish between investment 
projects with different rates of return, the market valuation of those projects is an “average value” 
reflecting the expected return across all project. Consequently, as in a typical lemon’s market, 
higher return projects are penalised since they attract lower than fair prices. This informational 
cost, or dilution cost, depends on the degree of informational asymmetry in the market, as well as 
on the type of financial contract issued by the firm to finance those projects – typically, equity or 
debt. On this basis, we interpret the development of stock market as the result of a change in the 
level of informational costs which decrease with capital accumulation and induce firms to switch 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the wake of a large body of empirical evidence, considerable research has been devoted to 
modelling and understanding the strong positive linkages between real and financial 
development. Much of this research has followed the so-called “functional” approach in the 
analysis of such linkages. For example, it is argued that financial markets and financial 
institutions can affect capital accumulation because they can affect the real allocation of 
resources between alternative technologies (Greenwood and Jovanovich, 1990; Saint-Paul, 1992; 
Bencivenga, Smith and Star, 1996; Blackburn and Hung, 1998) or because they can affect agents’ 
savings decisions by reducing liquidity costs and offering greater opportunities for diversifying 
risks (Bencivenga and Smith, 1991; Levine, 1991). The common feature of this literature has 
been the modification of the Arrow-Debreu framework through the introduction of information 
costs or other forms of transaction costs which impede the smooth functioning of financial 
markets.  
While much has been learnt from the above research, many issues have still to be explained 
and the co-evolution of the real and financial sectors of an economy remains a fertile area for 
investigation. Undoubtedly, the development of financial markets is a complex process that is 
intimately connected to real economic activity. As such, the metamorphosis and transformation of 
the financial system cannot be fully understood unless this is interpreted as a truly endogenous 
process involving dynamic structural change which is linked to changes in the real economy. 
Without recognising this, it would be difficult to explain how financial institutions evolve and 
how new financial arrangements emerge. As Levine (1997) emphasises, there is need for further 
research into many aspects of financial development which have so far received relatively little 
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aspect. 
 Empirical evidence shows clearly the existence of a strong positive correlation between 
stock market development and economic growth (Atje and Jovanovich, 1993, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine, 1996a, b, Korajczyk, 1996, Levine and Zervos, 1996, 1998). The development of 
stock markets is associated not only with an increase in the number of firms listed in the market, 
but also with an increase in the capitalisation of firms. The process of stock market development 
is also non linear, occurring abruptly and rapidly at first and continuing more gradually thereafter.  
At the theoretical level, the study of stock markets and growth has been given new impetus 
with recent analyses of the design of optimal financial contracts under asymmetric information in 
dynamic general equilibrium models (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Bencivenga and Smith, 1993; 
Bose and Cothren, 1996, 1997). This new body of research enables one to understand the 
evolution of the financial system and to explain how alternative types of financial contract may 
emerge to solve problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. These problems, arising from 
asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers, imply a violation of the Modigliani-
Miller theorem concerning the irrelevance of a firm’s capital structure. Essentially, firms in need 
of external finance face a cost minimisation problem which they must solve by issuing different 
forms of financial contracts under different circumstances. The crucial point is that this choice is 
affected by the level of capital accumulation.  
This paper aims to provide further insights into the linkages between stock market 
development and economic growth within the context of a dynamic general equilibrium 
framework of informational asymmetries, endogenous contract choice and capital accumulation 
(Boyd and Smith, 1998; Blackburn, Bose and Capasso, 2003). The analysis is based on a model 
of optimal capital structure, developed by Bolton and Freixas (2000), in which firms design 
optimal securities to finance risky investment projects. This model predicts that, when borrowers 
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of debt and/or equity. Because of asymmetric information, both the issue of equity and the issue 
of debt involve “dilution costs” as the market “averages” the expected value of the unobservable 
project outcomes of firms. As in Myers and Majluf (1984), the “pecking order” condition is that, 
in the absence of other distortions, debt always dominates equity due to the assumption that debt 
involves lower dilution costs. Unlike equity, however, debt may also entail some bankruptcy 
costs (e.g. liquidation may imply missed opportunities of future production), which may cause the 
preferred mode of financing to switch to equity. In what follows, we modify this framework by 
allowing for a higher level of heterogeneity among firms. The degree of asymmetric information 
in the economy is determined endogenously by the fact that the incentive of low productivity 
firms to mimic high productivity firms changes over time with the level of capital accumulation. 
We show that, as capital accumulation takes place, a lower number of non-creditworthy firms 
enter the capital market and this reduces the degree of informational asymmetry which, in turn, 
has consequences for the structure of the financial system. In addition, the model also seems 
capable of accounting for certain specific aspects of stock market development that some 
observers have found puzzling. In particular it has been noted that “further development of stock 
markets may affect firms differently in economies where the markets already play a significant 
role than in those where they do not. If stock markets are already significant, further development 
leads to a substitution of equity financing for debt. However, in economies where stock markets 
are too small to have a significant role in the economy,…, development permits large firm to 
increase their leverage" (Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Maksimovic V., 1996, p. 364). In other words, 
the effect of stock market development on the debt-equity ratio appears to depend on the level of 
development itself – the effect being positive at low levels of development but negative at high 
levels of development so that the debt-equity ratio displays non-monotonic behaviour.  
  4The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the economic environment in 
terms of the technologies, preferences and endowments of agents. In Section 3 we outline the 
structure of the credit market in which borrowing and lending take place. In Section 4 we study 
the optimal financial contract and identify the conditions under which one type of contract (debt 
or equity) dominates the other. Implications for growth and capital accumulation are discussed in 
Section 5. Section 6 presents some numerical simulations of the model which confirm the 
analytical results and illustrate the transitional dynamics. Section 7 offers some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. The Environment 
 
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 1, 2, ….. ∞. We consider an overlapping generations 
economy in which there is a constant population (normalised to 2) of two-period-lived, non-
altruistic agents. Agents of each generation are divided at birth into two equal sized groups of 
unit mass comprising households (workers or lenders) and firms (entrepreneurs or borrowers). 
Firms produce capital (for which they require loans from households) when young, and output 
when old. All agents are risk neutral and derive utility only from second period consumption. All 




Each young household is endowed with one unit of labour which is supplied inelastically to an 
old producer of final output in return for the wage, wt. This income can be stored for consumption 
in the second period, or lent out to a (young) producer of capital. The storage technology of 
  5households converts one unit of output at time t into ρ ≥ 1 units of output at time t+1. A loan to a 
capital producer is repaid in the subsequent period in terms of capital which the household rents 
out to final output producers.  
 
2.2 Capital Production 
 
Capital is produced from risky investment projects to which all entrepreneurs have access when 
young. The expected returns on these projects are different for different types of entrepreneur: 
there is a fraction,  , of type-1 entrepreneurs (skilled capital producers) whose expected 
return is high; a fraction,  , of type-2 entrepreneurs (semi-skilled capital producers) 
whose expected return is low; and a fraction, 
1 (0,1) n ∈
n2 (0,1) ∈
31 1 nn 2 n = −−, of type-3 entrepreneurs (unskilled 
capital producers) whose expected return is zero. The last group of firms also have access to a 
safe capital project which yields a certain rate of return.  
In addition to the above, firms are heterogeneous within each group according to their 
efficiency in running a project. Efficiency is defined in terms of the minimum amount of 
resources needed to be invested at time t in order to obtain a given amount of capital at time t+1. 
As regards the risky capital project, the efficiency of a firm is indexed by α, which is uniformly 
distributed on (0,1). The fixed cost of investment is given by a(α ), where a′(α )>0, so that higher 
values of α are associated with lower levels of efficiency. As regards the safe capital project, the 
efficiency of a (type-3) firm is indexed by β, uniformly distributed on (0,1) as well, and the fixed 
cost of investment is given by b(β ), where b′(β )>0. We assume that the level of efficiency in 
running risky and safe projects are independent of each other. That is, a type-3 entrepreneur who 
is relatively efficient in operating the risky project is not necessarily efficient in running the safe 
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activities. 
The fundamental informational asymmetry in the model is that while the efficiency levels 
(α and β) of firms are public knowledge, the type of firm (type-1, type-2 or type-3) is private 
information. This informational asymmetry is the source of capital market imperfections which 
drive the results of the analysis. 
The outcomes of risky projects for each group of firms is specified as follows: all type-1 
firms produce κ1 units of capital with probability p and 0 units of capital with probability 1−p; all 
type-2 firms produce  21 κ κ <
2 t p κ +
 units of capital with probability p and 0 units of capital with 
probability 1−p; and all type-3 firms produce 0 units of capital with certainty. Let rt+1 denotes the 
price of capital at t+1 (which is constant in equilibrium). We assume that 
11 1 () t rp a r κρ α + >>  for all  α. These restrictions imply that only type-1 firms obtain an 
expected return on the risky project which is sufficient to repay the minimum amount required by 
a lender for a loan of size a(α ).
1 Essentially, this means that households would never knowingly 
lend to type-2 and type-3 firms since households can always earn ρa(α ) amount of income from 
storage. The fact that such lending may take place is due to the existence of informational 
asymmetries.  
A safe capital project (operated only by type-3 firms) is governed by a linear technology 
which yields q units of capital at time t+1 per unit of output invested at t after the fixed initial 
outlay b(β ). For a  loan size of wt, therefore, a type-3 firm produces [wt −b(β )]q units of capital 
from the safe project.  
The foregoing description of capital production is summarised as follows: 
 
                                                 
1 Since rt+1=r (a constant) in equilibrium, and since a′(α)>0, then the assumption is satisfied by imposing the 
restriction rpκ1 >ρa(1) and rpκ 2 <ρa(0) 
  7  Risky Project  Safe Project 
Type-1   Initial outlay: a(α) 
Capital production: κ1  with prob. p 
0  with prob. 1-p 
 
Type-2   Initial outlay: a(α) 
Capital production: κ2  with prob. p 
0  with prob. 1-p 
 
Type-1   Initial outlay: a(α) 
Capital production: 0  with prob. 1 
Initial outlay: b(β ) 
Capital production: [wt −b(β )]q 
 
2.3 Output Production 
 
Entrepreneurs produce final output in the second period of their lives. We assume that, at a 
minimum, running risky projects confers non-marketable skills that enable all firms to produce 
(and consume) a subsistence amount of output, φ > 0, from home production. This assumption 
ensures that even type-2 and type-3 entrepreneurs (who always go bankrupt in the case of debt) 
may have the incentive to operate risky projects. Type-1 firms also have access to a production 
technology for combining their own skills with labour (supplied by young households of the next 
generation) and capital (acquired from projects undertaken previously by the same generation), to 
produce output in the market according to 
  ,  Θ, Φ > 0, θ ∈ (0,1),  (1) 
1
11 1 1 () tt t t yk l K
θθ −
++ + + =Θ +Φ 1 t h +
                                                
where yt+1 denotes output, lt+1 denotes labour, kt+1 denotes capital, Kt+1 denotes aggregate capital 
and ht+1 is a zero-one non-marketable skills variable. This production technology incorporates an 
externality effect associated with learning-by-doing, as in many types of endogenous growth 
model. Assuming that Φ > φ, it is always optimal for a type-1 firm to use this technology rather 
than home production.
2 At the same time, however, we assume that only firms that are non-
 
2 Assuming that agents can transfer skills from one activity to another is common in in the literature (see for example 
Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1996) . Moreover, it has been empirically shown that firms in transferring skills from some of 
their branches to others, firms can improve the productivity of the latter (Blomstrom et. al, 1998). 
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their own skills, ht+1=1. Those that go bankrupt cede control of this technology to lenders with 
zero contribution of manufacturing skills, ht+1=0. In other words, when a type-1 firm goes 
bankrupt it looses control of the output production technology and can supply its skills only in the 
home technology. 
Let κt+1 denotes the amount of capital produced by a type-1 firm. The firm is a net lender of 
capital if kt+1 < κt+1 and a net borrower of capital if kt+1 > κt+1. Accordingly, its profits are given by 
  . (2) 
1
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 () ( tt t t t t t t t kl K h w l rk
θθ π
−
++ + + + + + + + =Θ +Φ − − − 1 ) t κ +
1 Maximising (2) with respect to kt+1 and lt+1 gives 
11 1
11 1 tt t t klK r
θθθ θ
−− −
++ + + Θ =
1 t K =
, and 
. Recall that the number of type-1 firms is n
1
11 1 1 (1 ) tt t t klK w
θθ θ θ
−−
++ + + −Θ =
111 t nl+ =
1, and that households 
supply one unit of labour inelastically to these firms. In equilibrium, therefore,   and 
, so that the profit maximising conditions may be written as  
1 n k ++ 1 t
r   1 t r θ + Θ == , (3) 
  11 1 (1 ) (1 ) tt nk K w 1 t θ θ + + −Θ =−Θ =+
1 ) t +
. (4) 
The latter implies  , where W 1 ( t wW K + = '( ) 0 ⋅ > . Substituting (3) and (4) into (2) gives 
  11 tt r 1 t h π κ +++ = +Φ . (5) 
 
3. The Capital Market 
 
As indicated earlier, young entrepreneurs require external finance from young households in 
order to run the capital production technology. Borrowing and lending take place in the credit 
market which operates in the following way. At the beginning of each period, a newly-born 
borrower approaches a newly-born lender with a request for a loan to finance a capital project. 
  9Following others (e.g. Bencivenga and Smith, 1993; Bose and Cothren 1996, 1997) we make the 
simplifying assumption that there is a one-to-one matching between borrowers and lenders. Each 
borrower proposes a financial contract which specifies the size of the loan in terms of output (i.e. 
the lender’s wage), and the repayment of the loan in terms of capital (i.e. the outcome of the 
project). The contract also states whether repayment is in the form of debt, denoted by dt+1 (a 
lump-sum repayment from the proceeds of the project), or equity, denoted by st+1, (a payment that 
is proportional to the net profit from the project). It is possible to show that these are the only 
optimal forms of security that will be issued by the borrower.
3 Under both arrangements, a 
lenders’ participation constraint must be satisfied: that is, the expected income from a loan must 
be at least equal to the income that could be obtained from storage.  
In the case of safe capital projects, where returns are non-stochastic and there are no 
informational asymmetries (only type-3 firms run these projects), the entrepreneur will be 
indifferent between debt and equity contracts. By running such a project with a loan size of wt, a 
type-3 firm of efficiency level β produces ( ( )) t wb q β −  units of capital. Under a debt contract, 
the firm makes a payment of   units of capital to the lender and rents out the remaining capital 
to final goods producers to receive 
1 t d + 
1 ( ) ] t b qd β [( rw t + −−   units of output as income. In turn, the 
lender rents out the debt payment to final producers to receive rd 1 t+ 
t
 units of output as income. 
The lender's participation constraint is therefore rd 1 t w ρ + =  , and bankruptcy will never occur 
provided that  . 1 d + >  (( ) ) t wb q β −
) ) q
t
4 Under an equity contract, the firm makes a payment of 
1(( tt swb β + − 
(1
units of capital to the lender and rents out the remaining capital to final producers 
to receive  1)( ( tt rsw bq )) β + −−   units of output as income. The lender rents out the equity 
                                                 
r 0
3 See, for example, Bolton and Freixas (2000). 
4 Since  , then this condition may be written as  1 / tt dw ρ + =  (( ) ) tt rw b q w β ρ − −>  or () ( ) t rq w rqb 0 ρ β −− > , 
which requires that rq > ρ. Given this, then since  ( t wW K ) t =  (from (4)), with W '( ) 0 ⋅ > , and since b′(⋅) > 0, the 
condition is satisfied by imposing the restriction () 0 w r ( 1 ) 0 qb rq ρ − −> .  
  10payment to receive  1[( ( )] tt rs w b q β + − 
1[( ( )] tt rs w b q
 units of output as income. The lender’s participation 
constraint is therefore  t w β ρ =
)) t q
+ − 
( ( rw b
. In both cases, the borrower and lender receive the 
same compensation – namely,  t w β ρ − −  and  t w ρ , respectively – and the two contracts 
are completely equivalent. 




This is not the case with risky projects, for which the returns are stochastic and there is 
asymmetric information about the type of borrower. The financial contracts associated with these 
projects may involve bankruptcy and dilution costs. On the one hand, a debt contract is different 
from an equity contract because the latter does not require any minimum repayment to the lender. 
Consequently, there is the possibility of bankruptcy in the case of debt but not in the case of 
equity. On the other hand, both types of contract may involve dilution costs associated with the 
averaging of capital project returns across firms of unobservable type. Recall that with probability 
1 p −  the risky project delivers zero units of capital, whatever the firm’s type. Under such 
circumstances, any positive debt repayment,  , will always involve bankruptcy. Recall also 
that, with probability p, the project delivers 
0
 units of capital to a type-1 firm,   units of 
capital to a type-2 firm, and zero units of capital to a type-3 firm. We assume that 
which means that only type-1 firms remain solvent when the project succeed; type-
2 and type-3 firms are always bankrupt regardless of the project outcome.
2 κκ < 1
2 κ 11 t κ + >> d
5  
Given the above, it follows that type-2 and type-3 firms must masquerade as type-1 firms if 
they are to receive loans to finance risky projects. The maximum expected loan repayment of a 
type-2 (type-3) firm is   (0) units of capital which a household can rent out to earn a 
maximum expected income of   (0) units of output. But the household can always earn 
                                                 
2 κ 1 )
5 It can be shown that, for suitable parameter restrictions, the expression for dt+1 obtained under the assumption 
 is such that the assumption is always satisfied. The restrictions are  11 t d κ + >> 12 [ ( 1 )]( tt rzp z p a κ ηκ ρ +− >  and 
, the latter of which is always satisfied by virtue of the earlier assumption that 
for all α. 
21 [( 1 rp n κ +−
2 ( rp a κρ α <
1 ) ] ( n a η <
)
) ρ α
  112 () ( 0 ) ar p ρ ακ >>
[( ( )] t rw b q
 units of output from storing a(α) instead of lending it to firm. Consequently, 




It is evident that type-2 firms, for which the only investment opportunities are risky 
projects, will always have an incentive to mimic type-1 firms. Type-3 firms, however, may or 
may not be motivated to act in this way depending on whether the returns from risky projects are 
greater or less than the returns from running the safe project. Recall that, for a type-3 firm, 
running the risky project yields zero units of capital with certainty but enables the firm to acquire 
skills which can be used in home production. The payoff from risky projects (under either debt or 
equity contracts) is therefore φ units of home produced output. By contrast, a safe projects yields 
t w − units of output (under either debt or equity contracts) to a type-3 firm of 
efficiency level β. It follows, therefore, that a type-3 firm will not run a risky project (i.e. will not 
mimic a type-1 firm) if  [( ( )] t rw b q w t β ρ −− φ > . Now, define a  t β ∈(0,1) such that  
  [( ( )] tt t rw b q w β ρ −− φ = . (6) 
In words,   defines the marginal type-3 firm which is indifferent between the risky and the safe 
project. Since  , then all firms with  0 ⋅> t β β <  undertake the safe project, while all firms with 
t β β >  undertake the risky project. The marginal firm can be considered as a function of the 
wage rate,  () tt B w = β , such that (i)  0 t β =  for  ( ) 0 B ⋅ ≤ , (ii)  1 t β =  for  ( ) 1 B ⋅ ≥ , and (iii)  (0,1) t β ∈  
with   for  . Moreover, since β is uniformly distributed on (0,1), then  '( ) B 0 ⋅> ( ) B (0,1) ⋅∈ t β  is 
also understood to be the fraction of type-3 firms that do not run risky projects, with 1 t β −   being 
the fraction of type-3 firms that do run risky projects.  
 
 
  124. Optimal Contracts  
 
In what follows we determine the optimal financial contract for risky projects when lenders are 
faced with loan applications from borrowers of unknown type. In considering these applications, 
a household takes account of the fact that all type-2 firms have an incentive to mimic type-1 firms 
and that some type-3 firms may have the same incentive as well. It follows that the level of 
informational asymmetry – the probability that the household faces a type-2 or type-3 firm 
(instead of a type-1 firm) – is an endogenous variable since it depends on the incentive of type-3 
firms to cheat, which depends, in turn, on the prevailing wage rate. Recall that the populations of 
type-1, type-2 and type-3 firms are  ,   and 1 1 n 2 n 1 nn 2 − −  respectively. From above, the fraction 
of type-3 firms that mimic type-1 firms is  t β . Accordingly, the probability that a firm applying 
for a loan is actually a type-1 firm is given by  
 
1







−− − ++ 2
 (7) 
Thus,  11 1 2 ()[,/ ( ) tt zZ n n nn β =∈ + ] , where,  '( ) 0 Z ⋅ > . This probability provides a measure of the 
degree of asymmetric information. A decrease in the fraction of type-3 firms masquerading as 
type-1 firms (i.e. an increase in  t β ) leads to an increase in this probability. Higher values of zt are 
therefore associated with lower degrees of information asymmetry. 
It is now possible to determine the expected market value of a risky project. This is given 
by  a weighted average of the expected return on the risky project for each type of firm, where the 
weights correspond to the fraction of each type of firm in the population. That is, the expected 
value of a project is  12 (1 ) tt zp z p κ ηκ +− , where  22 3 2 1 /( ) /(1 ) nnn n n η = += −(i.e., the fraction of 
non-type-1 firms that are type-2). Given this, one can then turn to the determination of the 
optimal financial contract, either equity or debt. In doing this it is important to emphasise that, 
while both debt and equity involve dilution costs (due to the averaging of project outcomes across 
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of contract over the other will depend on the relative magnitude of these costs. As in Bolton and 
Freixas (2000) we will assume that equity is associated with higher dilution costs, otherwise 
equity will always dominate. It follows that, in absence of bankruptcy costs debt will always 
dominate equity. It also follows that firms issue either debt or equity, but never a combination of 
the two.  
 
Characterisation of equity contract. 
 
When a type-1 firm issues equity to finance its project, a lender expects to receive an equity 
payment of   units of capital which can be rented out to receive an 
expected income of   units of output. Since the lender’s participation 
constraint is 
11 [( 1 ) tt t sz p zp κη + +−
11 [( tt rs z pκ + +−




1 ) t z p η
2 ] a κ ρ + −= , it follows that a type-1 firm of efficiency level α 
















Thus, the amount of equity needed to be issued in order to undertake the risky project is a 
function of both the firm’s efficiency level and the degree of informational asymmetry in the 
economy. Formally,  ,1 (,) tt sS z α α + = , where  () 0 z S ⋅ <  and  ( ) 0 Sα ⋅ > .
6 
From (5), the expected net income of the firm is given as Vr . 
Substitution of (8) yields 
11 1 (1 )
E





[( 1 ) ] ( )













p = +Φ 
+− 

                                                
. (9) 
 
6 Obviously, it is required that  . This is satisfied under the same parameter restrictions needed to assure 
. 
,1 (0,1) t sα + ∈
11 t d κ + >
  14Hence, VV ,1 (,)
EE
tt z α α + = , where V  and V ( ) 0
E
z ⋅> ( ) 0
E
α ⋅ < . 
 
Characterisation of debt contract. 
 
When a type-1 firm issues debt to finance its project, the expected repayment to a lender is 
1 (1 ) tt t zp d z p 2 η κ + +−
1 [( 1 tt t rzp d z p
 units of capital which can be rented out to obtain an expected income of 
2 ] ) η κ + +−
1 [( 1 tt t rzp d z p
 units of output. Since the lender’s participation constraint is 















= . (10) 
As for the equity payment, the debt payment is a function of the firms efficiency level and the 
degree of asymmetric information: dD ,1 (,) tt z α α + = , where  () 0 z D ⋅ <  and . ( ) 0 Dα ⋅>
7 
From (5), the firm’s expected net income is deduced as Vr 11 1 ()( 1
D
tt p d p p ) κ φ ++ =− + Φ + − .
8 













κη κ ρ α
p p φ +
+− −
=+ Φ + − . (11) 
Thus, VV ,1 (,)
DD
tt z α α + = , where V  and V ( ) 0
D
z ⋅> ( ) 0
D





                                                 
7 Since rpκ 2 <ρa(α) by assumption, then dt+1>0. 
8 Recall that, with probability p, the firm is successful, repays the loan and retains control over output production; 
with probability 1 , the firm is unsuccessful, goes bankrupt and produces output at home.  p −
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The optimal choice of contract for a type-1 firm is determined by a comparison of the firm's 
expected payoff in the two cases. An equity contract is chosen if VV ,1 ,1 0
ED
tt αα ++ − > , while a debt 
contract is chosen if VV . Let  ,1 ,1 0
ED
tt αα ++ −< t α  denote the efficiency level of a firm such that 
,1 ,1 0
ED
tt VV αα ++ −= . That is, from (9) and (11), 
  { } 12
12
[ ( 1) ] ( ) ( 1)
(1 )( ) 0
[( 1 ) ]
tt t t
tt t
rzp z p a z p
p
zz p z p




−Φ − − =
+−
2 . (12) 
This  t α  defines the marginal type-1 firm which is indifferent between issuing debt and issuing 
equity. Since a′(α)>0, then all firms with  t α α <  issue debt and all firms with  t α α >  issue 
equity. The marginal firm is a function of the degree of informational asymmetry,  t α =A(zt), such 
that (i)  1 t α =  for  , (ii)  ( ) 1 A ⋅≥ 0 t α =  for  ( ) 0 A ⋅ ≤ , and (iii)  (0,1) t α ∈  for  . Moreover, 
since α is uniformly distributed on (0,1), then 
( ) (0,1) A ⋅∈
t α  is understood to be the fraction of type-1 firms 
issuing debt, with 1 t α −  being the fraction of type-1 firms issuing equity. A detailed analysis of 
the condition under which one type of contract dominates the other is contained in the Appendix 
and summarised in Fig. 1. 
For each  (0,1) α∈ , the difference in payoffs under equity and debt, VV ˆ(; ) (; ) (; )
ED V α αα ⋅ =⋅−⋅ is 
a concave function in  (0,1) t z ∈  (note that   and 
, ∀α). The highest of these curves is the locus corresponding 
to α =1, the lowest is the locus corresponding to α =0 (recall a′(α)>0). Given an initial value of 
z
0
ˆ lim ( ; )
t t z Vzα + → =+ ∞
1 lim (1 )( ) 0
t z p α − → =− Φ − >
1 2 ) ] zn n +
ˆ( ; ) t Vz
01 1 [, / ( n n ∈
φ
t,  , the marginal type-1 firm is determined by (12), for which  00 ˆ(; ) α 0 Vz = . 
Since Vz >0, each Vz 0 (, ) ⋅ ˆ
α 0 ˆ(;) α  curve, for  0 α α > , lies above the horizontal axis at z0, implying 
  16that the type-1 firm of efficiency level  0 α α >  prefers equity to debt (see Fig. 1). Conversely, 
each Vz 0 ˆ(;) α  for  0 α α < , lies below the horizontal axis at z0, so that the type-1 of efficiency level 
0 α α <  prefers debt to equity. As zt increases the fraction of firms preferring one contract to the 
other,  t α , changes. 
(;0 ) ⋅
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5. Capital Accumulation 
 
In order to determine the path of capital accumulation in the economy, it is necessary to compute 
the amount of capital produced in each period by each type of firm. The total population of type-1 
firms in the economy is n1. All of these firms run the risky project and each of them produces κ1 
  17units of capital with probability p. Therefore, the total amount of capital produced by type-1 firms 
is   with probability p. The total population of type-2 firms in the economy is n 11 nκ 2. All of these 
firms run the risky project as well and each of them produces κ2 units of capital with probability 
p. Thus the total amount of capital produced by these firms is  22 n κ with probability p. The total 
number of type-3 firms is 1 . A fraction of these,  1 nn −− 2 (1 ) t β − , runs the risky project and 
produce zero units of capital. The remaining fraction,  t β , runs the safe project and produce 
[( ( )] t wb q β −  units of capital. The total amount of capital produced by these firms is therefore 




[( ( )] t wb q d β β −− − ∫ . By applying the law of large numbers it is possible to determine 
the aggregate capital accumulation path as 
  11 12 2 12 0 (1 ) [( ( )]
t
tt Kn pn p n n w bq d
β
κκ β + =++ − − − ∫ β  
  1 12 2 12 120 (1 ) (1 ) ( )
t
tt n p n p nn q w nn qb d
β
κκ β β =++ − − − − − ∫ β . (13) 
Since  wt=W(Kt) from eq. (4), and  ( t ) t B w β =  from eq. (6), it follows that 
1 (,) tt Kf K t β + = = , where  () t FK '( ) F ⋅ = { } 12 ( 1 ) ' () ' () [ ()] 0 tt nn q W B wb β − −⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ >  and 
.   11 (0) Fn p =+ 22 n p κκ
The main factor in influencing the capital accumulation path (and long run equilibrium) is 
the incentive for type-3 firms to mimic type-1 firms and undertake risky project investment (as 
opposed to safe project investment). This incentive changes over time with capital accumulation 
itself. Specifically, as Kt increases, then so too does wt and so too does  t β , implying a fall in the 
number of type-3 firms that are inclined to run the risky projects. The implications of this may be 
evaluated by examining the two extreme cases where  t β  takes on its corner values.  
  18Suppose, first, that  0 t β = . This is the case in which all type-3 firms mimic type-1 firms, so 
that the capital accumulation path would be  11 2 (, 0 ) t 2 f Kn p n p κ κ = + . This path implies a 
constant level of capital at 
 
*
11 2 Kn p n p 2 κ κ =+ (14) 
Suppose, alternatively, that  1 t β = , which is the case in which no type-3 firm mimics type-1 
firms. Then the capital accumulation path becomes 
1
1 12 2 12 120 ( ,1) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) tt f Kn p n p n n q K n n q b d κκ θ β =++ − −− Θ + − − ∫ β , 
which implies either a steady state point at 
 
1
11 22 1 2 ** 0
12
(1 ) ( )
1( 1 ) ( 1 )










if 1( 12 1 ) ( 1 ) nn q θ >−− −Θ , or a long run growth rate of 
  12 (1 ) (1 ) gn n q θ =−− −Θ  (16) 
if 1( 12 1 ) ( 1 ) nn q θ <−− −Θ . These scenarios are depicted in Fig. 2. Given the positive correlation 
between the structure of the financial system and the level of real economic activity, it is possible 
to distinguish between two regimes: a low development regime with a relatively low level of 
economic activity and predominance of debt and high development regime with a relatively high 
level of economic activity and predominance of equity. Transition between these regimes 
depends on the initial level of capital and on the shape of the capital accumulation path. The case 
of multiple equilibria is represented in Fig. 2a. Depending on the initial level of capital, the 
economy can either be trapped in the low development regime with a low steady state level of 
capital k
* (if k0 < k
c), or it can converge towards a high development regime (if k0 > k
c), with high 
steady state level of capital, k
**, or a positive long run growth rate (bold section of the capital 
accumulation path).The case of unique equilibrium is represented in Fig. 2b. In this case, the 
  19economy displays always transition between low development regime and high development 
regime (with a positive steady state level of capital, k
** or a positive long run growth rate). 
By affecting the incentives of type-3 firms to mimic type-1, capital accumulation affects the 
degree of informational asymmetry and, with it the choice of financial contract. Given that Kt 
increases, then the resulting increase in  t β  leads to an increase in zt and a decrease in  t α . Along 
the trajectory path, therefore, the amount of informational asymmetry falls and the number of 






















Fig. 2a  Fig. 2b   
 
6 Numerical Simulations 
 
The foregoing analytical results are confirmed by numerical simulations of the model. For 
these simulations, we assume that  01 () aa a α α = +  and bb 0 () 1 b β β = +  and experiment with 
  20parameter values around the following benchmark set: n1=0.5; n2=0.125; p =0.5; κ1=2; κ2=0.25; 
a0 =0.025; a1 =0.125; b0 = 0.5; b1 =0.125; Q = 20; Φ=1; ϕ =0.9875; Θ=1; θ =0.5; ρ =1. This 
benchmark set of values gives rise to transition between development regimes with positive long-
run growth. Under such circumstances, the typical shapes of the trajectories of variables are as 
shown in Figure 2b. Thus, the proportion of type-3 firms that do not mimic type-1 firms ( t β ) 
increases over time while the proportion of type-1 firms that issue debt ( t α ) decreases over time. 
These events are reflected in a surge of growth which eventually converges to a long-run 
stationary value. An example of multiple equilibria is provided by the case in which all 
parameters remain at their benchmark values except for Q = 14.75. The critical level of capital in 
this case is k
c = 0.90. Initial levels of capital below this value cause the economy to converge to 
the low steady state equilibrium, k
* , while initial levels of capital above this value level lead the 
economy onto a path of perpetual growth. 
Figure 2 depicts the case in which  t α  is monotonically decreasing over time as the 
economy moves from a low development regime to a high development regime. Interestingly, 
however, the model has the potential to generate non-monotonic behaviour in  t α , which may 
increase at first and then decrease subsequently. This is indicated by the simulation results which 
show that the relationship between  t α  and zt is an inverted u-shape function. If the model is able 
to produce such behaviour in  t α , then it will be able to explain the apparent puzzle of why stock 
market development appears to be associated with an increase in the debt-equity ratio at low 




  217. Final Considerations 
 
The main objective of this paper has been to provide an account of the role played by economic 
development in the evolution of financial markets. The empirical evidence shows clearly that 
stock market activity is closely related to real activity, with firms having a greater preference 
towards issuing equity (rather than debt) as capital accumulation proceeds. In other words, the 
optimal capital structure of firms depends fundamentally on the level of economic development. 
In order to understand the link between financial markets and growth, it is necessary to 
depart from the fiction of a perfectly functioning representative agent paradigm and to move 
towards a framework based on market imperfections where the Modigliani-Miller theorem fails 
to hold. The recent literature that has taken on this challenge has provided significant new 
insights and raised important issues for further consideration. The model presented in this chapter 
has the distinguishing feature that the degree of informational asymmetry is not exogenous, but 
rather changes over time with changes in the incentives of low productivity firms to masquerade 
as high productivity firms. The higher is the level of development, the lower is the proportion of 
firms that have such incentives, and the lower is the degree of asymmetric information. This leads 
to a higher value attached by the market to risky investment projects and a greater number of 
firms that prefer to issue equity rather than debt.  


















Φ 1 (1, ) ( ) 0
E p a ακ ρ α   and  Vr = −+ Φ > . 
In addition, 
  >0,  V < (>) 0 for z > (<) ()
E











;   and V ( )
E
α ⋅ >0. 
From (11),  
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The above results imply that, for a given α, the payoffs under equity and debt are both increasing 
in z∈(0,1), and that the payoff under equity dominates the payoff under debt for z→ 1
- and       
z→ 0
+. 
Now, define V =  V . By using (9) and (11)  ˆ() ⋅ ( )
E ⋅− ()
D V ⋅
  { } 12
12
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   and V
0
ˆ lim ( )
z V + → ⋅= + ∞ ˆ(1, ) α = (1 − p)(Φ − φ) > 0   (A2) 
Figure 3 gives a diagrammatic representation of V ˆ() ⋅ ,  V ()
E ⋅  and V ( )
D ⋅ for a given α∈(0,1). 
The expression for V ˆ(; ) α ⋅  determines a set of u-shaped concave functions in zt∈(0,1), each 
for a given value of α∈(0,1). Since, Vz 0 ˆ (, )0 α ⋅ > , the highest of these curves is the one associated 
  23with  α = 1, the lowest is the one associated with α = 0 (see Fig. 1). If all of these curves were 
lying above the zt axis, then no type-1 firm would ever issue debt (in this case V  ∀α in 
). It follows that the presence of debt in the economy requires that, for some 
values of z
ˆ(; ) 0 α ⋅>
11 1 2 [, / ( ) ] t zn n n n ∈+
t in the given interval, a fraction, or all of the V ˆ(; ) α ⋅  curves should intersect the zt axis 
and, hence, V  for some α. If this is the case, it is possible to determine an initial value   ˆ(; ) 0 α ⋅<
01 1 1 2 [, / ( ) zn n n n ∈+ ]
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D V α ⋅
(; )


















 for which there is a type-1 firm of efficiency level  0 α , indifferent between 
debt and equity (i.e. 00 ˆ(; )0 α = Vz ). All type-1 firms with  0 α α >  issue equity (since 
) and all type-1 firms with  0 α α <  issue debt (since  0 ˆ(; αα < Vz ).  
Formally, the above requires that, at least for some initial value of zt and for some α, the 
(12) is holding. Setting  ˆ(, ) t V α ⋅  = 0 gives the following quadratic equation in zt: 
 
2
01 (; ) tt t t Cz cz c z c α 2 = ++  (A3) 
  24 
with 
012 2 () [ ( 1 ) ( )] cp r κη κ φ η κ =− −Φ − + > 0 p
2
 
12 1 2 2 (1 )( ) ( ) [ ( ) ] cp r p a r p φ ηκκ η κ η κ ρ α ηκ =− Φ −− − − −  
22 [( ) ca r 2 ] p ηκρα η κ =−  
The existence of an  0 α  requires that the quadratic equation has at least one real root. The roots of 
the quadratic equation, z1t and z2t, are real if 
2
10 2 4 cc c 0 − > . Given this, then both roots must lie 
between 0 and 1.  
Given the shape of the payoff functions, for each zt there is only one V ˆ(, ) α ⋅  intersecting the 
horizontal axis at zt. As zt increases the value of  t α  (and, therefore, the specific V ˆ(, ) α ⋅ ) changes, 
and so does the corresponding fraction of type-1 firms issuing debt or equity. Condition for  t α  to 
decrease monotonically with zt is that given an initial value of  , the 
difference in payoffs must be such that 
01 [, zn ∈ 1 / ( n n 1) n 2 ] +
ˆ()/ Vz ∂ ⋅∂ >0  ∀α ∈(0,1) and ∀ 11 [, zn 1 / ( n n 2 ) t n ] ∈ + .  It is 
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